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Chapter 8 
 
Inter-basin transfers as a supply option: 
the end of an era? 
 
Jean-Daniel Rinaudo & Bernard Barraqué 
1 Introduction 
In the past, when water demand in large metropolitan areas outstripped local supply, additional 
water was often secured by tapping into other river basins. As a reflection of the enormous interests 
at stake, such economic centres devoted correspondingly impressive financial resources and 
technical ingenuity to the design and construction of inter-basin projects. Examples of projects 
transferring hundreds of millions of cubic meters per year over hundreds of kilometers abound in 
different parts of the world, including Australia, Europe, Northern and Southern America, and Asia. In 
the USA for instance, the largest metropolitan areas – including New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, 
Oakland and San Francisco, Houston, Dallas, and Miami – rely on large scale inter-basin transfers 
(IBTs). Most were built during the 19th and 20th centuries, reflecting a phase that Barraqué calls the 
civil engineering paradigm (see Barraqué et al, this volume). 
The issue became more complex after WW2. On the one hand, under American influence, 
international finance institutions supported new-born nation-states, which, emerging from 
colonisation, endeavoured to develop their economies via hydraulic projects. On the other hand, in 
the US (and soon after in other developed countries), economic tools like cost–benefit analysis were 
increasingly used to legitimise projects funded from government and other sources. The idea that 
hydraulic projects should finance themselves via their beneficiaries slowly eroded the older 
‘pork barrel’ philosophy. From about 1965, the environmental protection movement brought 
additional arguments against large hydraulic projects, and plans for many yet to be built began to be 
shelved since they seemed to perform poorly on both economic and environmental grounds. 
However, even today some projects still proceed, and indeed some large ones have emerged, as in 
China.   
This chapter is devoted to discussing the evolving role of IBT in urban water management. We argue 
that the era of large IBT development is about to end, at least in democratic developed countries. 
The chapter starts with providing an historical overview of IBT development, distinguishing ancient 
drinking water aqueducts and multipurpose urban water projects. The next section describes how 
IBTs are challenged by a change in the technological and economic context. It shows how the 
emergence of alternative technologies, such as desalination, wastewater reclamation and reuse, or 
managed artificial groundwater recharge is reducing the attractiveness of IBTs. Water utilities are 
also becoming increasingly aware that water conservation programs can save volumes of water at a 
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much cheaper cost than IBT. In section 4, IBTs are discussed within the changing socio-political 
context. We show, through various international examples, that IBTs trigger many questions and 
concerns from communities involved or affected, questions such as the environmental impact on 
donor and receiving river basins, the economic impact on donor regions, the impact on local cultures 
and livelihoods, how costs and benefits are distributed (social justice), and issues related to public 
participation. In a final section, we look ahead at new and more efficient uses of existing IBTs. We 
suggest they can be used for increasing the flexibility of how water is allocated over space and time. 
As conjunctive use management approaches gain support, IBTs will be operated in conjunction with 
aquifer storage and recovery schemes, and they will probably support the development of emerging 
water markets, in particular during drought years.  
 
2 IBTs in contemporary history 
Cities, and urban civilizations, have always depended upon fresh water. There are many examples of 
once glorious civilizations which disappeared due to changes in hydrologic conditions or extreme 
events (which they themselves sometimes provoked): Fatehpur Sikri, Angkor Wat, Mayan cities. 
Other cities were defeated when their conquerors destroyed their water supplies.  
In most of these cases, water was required as a vital resource, but somewhat indirectly for irrigation 
and other human uses, including for drinking. More directly, with the Roman Empire for example, 
long distance aqueducts were developed primarily for urban comfort and drinking, since the amount 
of (pure) water carried was insufficient for irrigating crops. Most aqueducts ceased to function after 
the fall of the Roman Empire, and only a few small ones were built during the Middle Ages under 
feudal rule (monasteries). The one exception was Rome where a single aqueduct survived (Acqua 
Marcia, 91 km). 
The idea of acquiring clean, fresh water from a distance was picked up again by Italian engineers 
during the Renaissance. It was very much needed because at the time a proto-industry was being 
developed based, in part, on putrefaction techniques, the effect of which was to cause local urban 
water to become increasingly polluted (Guillerme 1983). Nevertheless, aqueducts were costly and 
reserved only for kings, their castles, and patrician palaces, although they would eventually come to 
serve public fountains. Most cities relied on local water sources, either wells or river water served by 
vendors.  
During the 18th century water was increasingly considered a potential source of disease and even of 
epidemics (given the miasmatic theory). Experts of the time either favoured filtration, which was 
already experimented with, or distant sources. Before the discovery of microbes in the second half of 
the 19th century, there was no way to ascertain which of these two technologies was better. The 
choice was between small quantities of pure water from distant sources, or larger quantities of 
unsafe local water, which could be pumped thanks to the rapid spread of the steam engine at the 
turn of the XIXth century. Fire-fighting and parks watering also required water, and urbanization led 
to a dramatic increase in solid waste accumulation in the streets; many local authorities imagined 
they should ‘wash the city clean’, an option that required yet more water. 
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2.1 POTABLE WATER AQUEDUCTS 
Some of the aqueducts bringing water to palaces or monasteries, or even to public fountains, have 
long histories: the New River project in London dates to the 16th century and was 68 km long; the 
Medici aqueduct feeding the (now) Luxembourg palace in Paris from Rungis springs dates from 1623 
and ran for 13 km. In turn, progressive improvement in the technologies of pipe welding and faucet 
design allowed the development of water supplies under pressure, extending to within residential 
buildings. Enlarged water capacity was also needed to deal with waste evacuation, notably once 
London decided to turn the drainage system to the discharge of human waste. The combined sewer 
was born, and this innovation needed flushing if the slope was insufficient or the rain too infrequent. 
In Britain, however, taking freshwater from distant sources was not easy for both hydrological and 
legal reasons: not only were there no large mountains or aquifers to draw water from, but the 
riparian rights, which translated the common law to the water domain, meant that cities needed an 
act of Parliament to catch distant water. Even though some cities like Glasgow managed to draw 
clean water from up to 55 km away (and as early as 1859), others preferred to take water from a 
nearby river and filter it. In London, filtration became mandatory in 1852 after a major cholera 
outbreak. Birmingham, the champion city for public water (and gas) procurement, had to wait until 
1902 to get fresh water from a reservoir built in Wales 100 km away (Kraemer & Barraqué 2012). 
As early as 1837, New York decided to fetch water from Croton Lake, located north of Manhattan in a 
rural area about 60 km east of the Hudson river. A dam was built to store more water in the lake, and 
a 66 km aqueduct took water to a fountain in Manhattan in 1842. For centuries, Madrid in Spain had 
been served by groundwater, relying on the ancient Persian technology of the Qanats (horizontal 
galleries draining dripping groundwater). But in the 19th century, supplies became inadequate, and 
in 1851 a new aqueduct was built from mountains north-west of the capital, about 60 km away1. In 
Paris in 1860, Baron Haussmann, a powerful Prefect of the time, found an engineer of the corps, 
Eugene Belgrand, who knew the nature of all the springs around Paris, and this engineer drew up a 
plan to divert several springs to Paris via a system of aqueducts that would take water from around 
100 km away (Deutsch & Gautheron 2012). It took almost a century for the plan to be fully 
implemented, but today these aqueducts provide half of the water Parisians drink, while Paris 
suburbs depend either on surface water from the Seine and its tributaries or from shallow aquifers. 
Before the First World War, New York City extended its long distance aqueducts up to the Catskill 
mountains 250 km to the north. Other cities in the eastern part of the country, like Boston, also built 
in-stream storage facilities further and further away from urban areas. The first reservoir, Cochituate, 
built between 1845 and 1848, was only 27 km away, but the most recent, Quabbin, built in the 
1930s, is 105 km away. The longest transfers can be found in California, most likely due to the 
Mediterranean-type climate. Around WW1, Los Angeles managed to appropriate freshwater from 
the Owens Valley and transferred it across a mountain range (375 + 220 km), while San Francisco 
built the Hetch Hetchy aqueduct from the Yosemite Mountains (269 km), and Oakland another line 
from the Moktelumne river (153 km). Some time later, Southern California even took water from the 
Colorado River 389 km away across a range of mountains. 
                                                          
1
 See “The Croton Aqueduct”, New York Historical Society at https://www.nyhistory.org/seneca/croton.html 
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In Europe, construction of long distance transfers usually depended upon authorisations, and they 
required subsidies or low interest loans by national or central governments, the reason they were 
frequently reserved for capital cities. Lyon, the second largest city in France, always took its water 
from an alluvial aquifer in a natural area upstream of the Rhone. Conversely, Lisbon received water 
from a reservoir upstream through a magnificent aqueduct (Aguas Livres) built by the government in 
the 19th century, an aqueduct which incidentally provides little water compared to the needs of 
modern hygiene (Schmidt 2012). As soon as water treatment could take advantage of discoveries in 
microbiology, it became cheaper to provide safe water pumped from rivers close to cities, and many 
aqueduct projects became financial white elephants.  
But of course, water transfer projects were still being built throughout the Mediterranean and in 
other areas of water scarcity. In France, the Canal de Marseille is an 80 km transfer from the 
Durance, providing water to Marseille as early as 1849, but which was constantly improved until 
1970, when it was supplemented with a regional water scheme called Canal de Provence2. Another 
example is the Landeswasserversorgung in Baden Württemberg, a complex system of aqueducts 
from the mountains in the south to the urbanised north (in the Stuttgart area). It was a national 
project funded and owned by the German government in the early 20th century, and it was only 
after WW2 that it was transformed into an inter-municipal joint board3. The most impressive 
example in Europe between the two World Wars remains the Italian Aquedotto Pugliese4, a regional 
scheme to bring water to the driest part of the country (the heel of the boot), and which has long 
been the largest regional water supply scheme in terms of population served (4.5 million).  
2.2 MULTIPURPOSE PROJECTS AND URBAN INTERBASIN TRANSFERS 
In the early 20th century, the increasing involvement of national states in economic matters led to an 
unprecedented rise of large hydraulic projects, including dams and transfers, and this time it was not 
only to bring water to cities. Projects usually started with hydroelectricity generation, requiring the 
construction of reservoirs. But then it also became conceivable to regulate river flows so as to 
enlarge navigability periods, provide water for irrigation, and for industry. Eventually such projects 
also included water for cities, but it was not their main goal.  
The United States played a major role in this development, the reason being that they could mobilise 
important major amounts of capital and direct them to areas that were wild or even desert. One of 
the first projects was the construction of a canal from the Colorado to the Imperial Irrigation District, 
a desert located between San Diego and the Mexican border (1898). This project was followed by 
many other state or federal projects, resulting in the interlinking of Californian watersheds and 
valleys from north to south5. Today, more than three-quarters of the water is used for irrigation, and 
progress in water efficiency has created the opportunity to re-allocate water for other higher value 
uses. 
Similar projects were constructed in several western states, in particular in Colorado and Arizona. 
The city of Denver, Colorado, which is located on the eastern slopes of the Rocky Mountains, put in 
place a long distance infrastructure to convey water from the western side of the range. As a 
                                                          
2
 See the Canal de Provence website at http://www.canal-de-provence.com 
3
 See website of Landeswasserversorgung – Trinkwasser für Baden-Württemberg at http://www.lw-online.de/ 
4
 See the Aquedotto Pugliese website at www.aqp.it 
5
 See the Californian Department of Water Resources at www.water.ca.gov 
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compensatory measure for people in areas from where the water came, reservoirs reserved for their 
sole use were also constructed (Blomquist et al., 2004). 
In Arizona, the development of the Colorado Aqueduct Project was mainly intended to supply the 
rapidly growing areas of Tucson and Phoenix, which had outgrown local surface water and 
groundwater resources. As is frequently the case with multipurpose projects, the transfers were 
mainly paid for by urban users, with additional water sold to farmers at a much lower price.  
However, the most representative example of this multipurpose project policy is to be found in the 
eastern United States: the Tennessee Valley Authority. This was a planned project to revitalise a 
depressed economic area after the 1929 crisis. It was also a federal government project to create a 
dream in which water mobilisation could create a new and modern way of life (with electricity for 
industry and homes). At the time, there was a similar project planned on the Rhone in France (CNR), 
but engineers and planners met strong resistance from local communities and the project remained 
limited to electricity generation on the Rhone between Switzerland and Lyon (the Génissiat dam). 
Similarly, the soviet regime built a similar project on the Dniepr under Stalin (the Goelro plan, with 
the Dnieprostroi hydroelectricity farm and education centre).  
The allied victory in 1945 led to the setting up of a new world order based upon the creation of new 
nation states. These new states were encouraged to promote economic development through the 
development of hydraulic infrastructure. American cooperation was influential, and the TVA is still 
considered to as an inspiring model, as this quote from the TVA website indicates:  
Under the leadership of David Lilienthal ("Mr. TVA"), the Authority became a model for 
America's governmental efforts to modernize Third World agrarian societies.6 
Many countries launched hydraulic projects combining electricity generation, irrigation, and urban 
water supply, as did Spain with the financial support of the US (Swyngedouw 1999). During the 
Franco dictatorship (1940–75), Spain became, in terms of number of dams, the third highest-ranking 
country in the world. Brazil also developed complex water and electricity projects in the 
metropolitan areas of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, and later with huge dams on the Parana. Even 
small countries like Israel7 or Tunisia8 built national water carriers for the sake of developing arid 
southern regions. Socialist countries also invested in large projects, with the USSR developing some 
in central Asia for cotton growing (the Ferghana valley in Uzbekistan). This project led to the drying 
up of the Aral Sea, because the part of the scheme which involved changing the course of a Siberian 
river southwards to feed the dying sea could not be built. In many developing countries, however, 
multipurpose schemes were legitimised by appeals to the need for urban water, even if this need 
remained minor. 
Despite growing doubts about the positive balance of pros and cons, and the retreat of the World 
Bank on several financing schemes, many of these projects went ahead: GAP (the Greater Anatolia 
project) in Turkey, Nile regulation with Toshka transfer in Egypt, the Three Gorges and South–North 
transfers in China, and the San Francisco–Ceara in Brazil. India is even now considering the 
                                                          
6
 Tennessee Valley Authority website at www.tva.gov  
7
 See presentation of the National Water Carrier at 
http://www.mekorot.co.il/Eng/Mekorot/Pages/IsraelsWaterSupplySystem.aspx   
8
 See website of the Tunisian National Water distribution society at www.sonede.com.tn/index.php?id=44  
The final version of this paper is published in : Understanding and managing urban water in transition. Edited by: Grafton Q., Daniell K.A., 
Nauges C, Rinaudo J-D. & Wai Wah Chan N. (2015) Springer.  
 
6 
construction of project linking rivers in the Himalayas to Kerala and Tamil Nadu, with eastern and 
western branches. 
After the rise of the environmental movement in the 1970s, multipurpose hydraulics started to 
receive criticism, beginning in the US, from ecologists and also economists. In France, the retreat of 
hydraulic engineers from the colonies gave rise in the 1960s to the development of new 
multipurpose projects at regional level. Three major regional planning companies were set up: 
Société du Canal de Provence, Compagnie du Bas-Rhone Languedoc, and Compagnie 
d’Aménagement des Côteaux de Gascogne. All of these started with irrigation as a major component, 
but Canal de Provence was more economically successful because it found urban and industrial 
customers able to pay close to the full cost of regional water.  
It was the rise of alternative solutions for urban water provision which undermined the economic 
rationale of IBTs. 
3 IBTs in a changing technological context 
Until the late 1980s, water transfers were often the sole technological option cities could rely upon 
to supplement local resources and meet fast-growing demand. The emergence of alternative 
technologies, such as desalination, wastewater reclamation and reuse, or managed artificial 
groundwater recharge – and the progressive decrease of their cost – strongly influenced the 
perception of IBTs by water managers and planners. At the same time, water utilities increasingly 
became aware that the demand for water could be curbed through proactive water conservation 
policies. Because significant volumes can be saved and devoted to new uses, water conservation has 
increasingly been considered as an alternative to water supply options – IBTs in particular. This 
section aims to illustrate how this change has happened through examples selected from different 
parts of the world.  
3.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF NON-CONVENTIONAL SUPPLY OPTIONS 
 IBT versus desalination 
Desalination represents a serious alternative to inter-basin transfer for a number of reasons. The first 
one is the declining cost of this water supply option. The most common technology chosen for new 
desalination plants today is reverse osmosis (60% of existing capacity), in which salt water is filtered 
under high pressure through semipermeable membranes. The cost of RO varies significantly 
depending of the quality of raw water used, the size of the plant, the site conditions, and the cost of 
energy (Zhou and Tol 2005; Ghaffour et al. 2013). Desalination of brackish groundwater, estuarine 
water, or contaminated fresh water is often preferred to seawater desalination due to reduced 
energy cost. Recent case studies have shown the full cost of such projects ranges between €0.3–0.7 
/m3 (Vedachalam and Riha 2012). A Spanish study estimated the cost of seawater desalination at 
about €0.7/m3 in the Segura basin, when facilities there operate at full capacity (Lapuente 2012). 
These costs are likely to continue to decrease if new low-energy technologies become successful 
(Ghaffour et al. 2013). 
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There are other reasons why desalination can be more attractive than IBTs for water utility 
managers. The prime advantage of desalination is that it is a secure and reliable source of supply, 
independent of climatic conditions, unlike IBTs which can be affected by drought. Desalination also 
produces very high water quality that can be blended with lower quality water supplies if necessary. 
For local politicians, desalination offers greater control of municipal water supplies, allowing them to 
freely consider a wide range of economic developments – without depending on water supplies from 
outside their jurisdiction. Last but not least, the mobilisation of financial resources is easier in the 
case of desalination as the private sector often gets involved through ‘build–own–operate–transfer’ 
(BOOT) contracts (Ghaffour et al. 2013). Since the associated costs are operational and maintenance 
costs rather than initial investment, they are easier to recover from customers, even if they are high. 
In comparison, IBTs have always been associated with cheap water because in fact they were heavily 
subsidised.  
Several large metropolitan areas confronted with mounting water scarcity (and even shortages 
during droughts) have preferred the desalination option rather than the construction of an inter-
basin transfer. The case of Barcelona provides a good illustration. In the 1990s, Barcelona 
investigated the possibility of importing water from the Rhône river, through an extension of the 
canal system that diverted water to the Montpellier region. The project consisted in constructing a 
330 kilometers long pipeline intended to transfer up to 400 million m3/yr to the metropolitan area. 
For reasons that will be further exposed below, the metropolitan area instead constructed a 200,000 
m³/day brackish groundwater desalination plant in 2009 which now satisfies 20% of Barcelona’s 
drinking water needs (Sauri 2012). 
Another example is the Kimberley pipeline scheme designed to supply Perth in Western Australia 
(Ghassemi and White 2007). Metropolitan Perth has a sustained population growth of over 1.5% per 
year and it is expected that demand could increase by 600 million m3/yr by 2050. In that context, 
numerous proposals have been developed since the late 1980s to transfer water from the wet 
tropical region of the Kimberleys to Perth and even Adelaide (op. cit. pp. 169–176). The preferred 
project consisted in constructing a 1400 mm diameter pipeline 1,840 to 2,100 km long (depending on 
route). Investment cost was estimated at A$8–11 billion (1990 dollars) and operating and energy 
costs were more than A$2 billion/yr. Overall, the total cost of imported water was estimated at A$5–
6/m3, which was five times above the cost of desalinated water (A$1.1/m3) and other alternative 
options such as groundwater extraction (A$0.3–0.8) ). After several studies, the Kimberley scheme 
was finally abandoned and a 45 million m3/yr desalination project was approved in 2003 at a cost of 
A$350 million. The Western Australian government also adopted a strategy of improving water use 
efficiency in all sectors and promoting water reuse.  
 IBT versus wastewater reclamation and reuse 
Another alternative to IBTs consists in using poorer quality water supplies and developing 
wastewater treatment (reclamation) for subsequent use as a water supply (reuse). Water reuse is 
growing in importance in the US, Australia, some parts of Asia (Singapore), and in Western Europe 
(Spain). Recycled water is most commonly used for groundwater replenishment or for landscape 
irrigation; much less frequently is it used for direct domestic reuse.  
Reclamation and reuse can be either centralised or decentralised. In decentralised systems, water 
reclamation facilities are located close to areas where commercial or residential demand exists for 
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reclaimed water. Only a fraction of the available wastewater is treated and distributed. This 
approach, which is sometimes referred to as “sewer mining” only requires the development of a 
small local secondary distribution network. Investment saving are likely to compensate the cost of no 
economy of scale.  
In a centralised system, wastewater is collected and treated (possibly up to drinking water standards) 
before being introduced into a water supply source (river, reservoir, or aquifer). A combination of 
three purification technologies is frequently used: micro-filtration, reverse osmosis, and UV 
treatment (Zekri et al. 2013). A well-known example is the groundwater replenishment program of 
Orange County Water District (OCWD) in California. OCWD has recently completed a new recycling 
facility that provides a new resource for the region. Wastewater is treated using reverse osmosis 
technology. It is then injected into the aquifer through a series of shallow and deep wells. The system 
is used both as a seawater intrusion barrier and a source of water. Groundwater is then pumped and 
used for drinking supply (indirect potable reuse) and distributed to consumers using the existing 
reticulation system. A variant, observed in other Californian water districts (see Chapter 11 on 
demand forecasting, this book), consists in directly distributing reclaimed water to customers 
through a dedicated reticulation network (‘purple pipe’) for non-potable use. The cost of this option 
is much higher due to the need to construct a dual distribution network. In Europe, the Dutch have 
long replenished the sand-dune aquifer between the Ranstad and the North Sea with monitored 
freshwater from the Rhine (when the quality is acceptable). In Barcelona, the AGBAR company also 
treats waste water through RO technology to recharge the alluvial aquifer of the Llobregat 15 km 
upstream from the drinking water plant of Sant Joan Despi. 
A number of studies have shown that the costs of managed artificial recharge and water reclamation 
compare favorably with those of alternative sources. In California, the total capital, operating, and 
maintenance costs were estimated at US$1.34/m3 for the West basin and US$0.77 for Orange County 
Water District, which is cheaper than imported water supplied by the Metropolitan Water District of 
Southern California (National Academy of Sciences 2012). In San Diego, the cost of recycled water is 
estimated at about €0.35/m3 (2001 value) which is equivalent to 90% of the potable water cost. The 
same results were found in Florida where the cost of recycled water was estimated at €0.3–0.37/m3  
(Miller 2006). Other comparable cost figures are reported for several projects worldwide (Zekri et al. 
2013). 
Recycled wastewater can also be introduced into surface water resources. Singapore opted for this 
option with the well-known NEWater project in the early 2000s. Wastewater is treated and blended 
with surface water resources in reservoirs. Recycled water will represent 15% of daily urban 
consumption once the planned treatment capacity is fully deployed. This technological change was 
implemented with the aim of reducing reliance on importing water from Malaysia. The cost of 
NEWater is estimated at less than €0.2/m3  (Tortajada 2006). 
3.2 IBTS VERSUS WATER CONSERVATION 
Although urban water utilities are still inclined to consider importing remote new resources to satisfy 
the needs of growing populations and economies, they are increasingly aware that the demand for 
water can be curbed through proactive water conservation policies, which often turn out cheaper 
than new water supply schemes. A projected transfer from Sweden to Denmark across the Sund was 
abandoned after Copenhagen drastically reduced its domestic water consumption. In the UK, the 
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regulator Ofwat banned water transfers from the north to the London area until water conservation 
measures were implemented to reduce leakage. In southern Italy, the Aquedotto Pugliese looked at 
the option of importing water from Albania across the Otrante Strait. But water conservation policies 
made this project unnecessary, as well as other, smaller and less fancy IBTs. 
There are a number of benefits associated with water conservation: containing demand avoids or 
postpones huge capital costs associated with the expansion of water supply and waste water 
treatment infrastructure. A number of studies have shown that reducing water demand through 
active water conservation measures can be much cheaper than mobilising new conventional or non-
conventional resources. In California, a study by the Pacific Institute estimated that more than 25% of 
existing water use could be saved at a cost below the marginal cost of water supply (Gleick et al. 
2003). Similar results were found in southern France (Rinaudo et al. 2010). 
Three main control levers can be used to promote urban water conservation. The first one consists of 
imposing minimum technical (or economic) water efficiency standards that water utilities need to 
comply with. This particularly applies to water distribution networks, which are still often 
characterised by high rates of leakage. Leakage can be reduced by setting up a technical and 
managerial organisation that allows for real-time detection of pipe bursts or leakage and rapid 
repair. It also requires increasing the replacement rate of old pipes, which can entail huge costs, 
especially if maintenance has been deferred for many years. Different regulatory approaches can be 
selected. France for instance has opted for the definition of maximum admissible rates of leakage 
based on technical criteria such as the number of customers per pipe kilometre (regulation of 27 Jan 
2012). A different approach is implemented in the UK where water companies are required to 
calculate an economically optimal level of leakage (ELL), which is such that the marginal cost of 
reducing leakages equals the marginal cost of mobilising new resources. 
The second tool consists of economic incentives to promote the adoption of water-efficient 
technologies. Two types of incentives have been widely used in the USA and more recently in 
Australia: price rebates, and water conservation oriented water rates. Rebate policies aim at 
encouraging the purchase of water-efficient appliances (e.g. AAA clothes washing machines, timers 
for garden sprinklers) or retrofitting of old inefficient appliances (toilets). Rebates can target 
domestic, commercial, or industrial users. European countries are making tentative attempts at using 
them. Pilot projects have been implemented in the UK (Waterwise 2009), Spain (Shirley-Smith et al. 
2008), and in some French counties (Corrèze, Gironde) through distribution of free or subsidised 
faucet aerators or ‘water hippos’ (bag-like devices that fit in the water cistern and reduce the volume 
of water flushed).  
Water conservation oriented rates have also been used to promote the wise use of water. Pricing 
tools are intended to simultaneously change water use behaviour (reduction of wastage) and 
promote the adoption of water-efficient appliances, fixtures, and fittings. The most frequently used 
tariffs are increasing block rates and seasonal rates. A number of studies have demonstrated the 
potential savings that can be achieved through such tariffs (Rinaudo et al. 2012). More complex 
budget-based rates are also becoming more popular in south-western states of the US. This approach 
consists of rates that are tailored to the situation of individual customers.9 In Europe, this rate 
                                                          
9 A water budget rate is an increasing block rate structure in which the block definition is different for each customer, based on an efficient 
level of water use by that customer (Mayer et al. 2008, quoted in Beecher 2012). 
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budgeting is not frequent, but some water companies in England propose variable tariffs, with either 
high fixed parts and low volumetric prices (for customers who have regular water uses) or low fixed 
parts and high volumetric ones (for people who may have low consumption but some peaks). 
However, experienced economists of applied water regulation suspect that these smart tariffs end 
up having paradoxical and ‘disconcerting’ effects (Beecher 2012). 
The third lever consists of raising customer awareness of water scarcity through information 
campaigns. This lever is often considered as a catalyst for and used in conjunction with technical and 
incentive-based measures. A few econometric studies have shown that they can, for instance, 
significantly enhance the effectiveness of water pricing measures (Kenney et al. 2008). 
Water conservation may also generate significant benefits related to energy savings. In the 
residential sector, these benefits may outweigh the cost of installed devices such as low flow shower-
heads or high efficiency washing machines and dishwashers.  
3.3 ECONOMIC COMPARISON OF IBTS WITH ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
In developed countries, water utilities are increasingly compelled by regulators to justify that the 
investment decisions they make are economically sound. This often implies conducting cost-
effectiveness or benefit–cost analyses10 to compare various water supply and demand management 
options. Inter-basin transfer projects must be compared not only to ‘soft’ water conservation 
measures (Gleick 2003) but also to alternative ‘hard’ water supply options, including desalination and 
waste water reuse. The economic comparison of alternative water management options is current 
practice in the US, where least-cost and benefit–cost analyses generally make up a full chapter of 
urban water management plans. It is also increasingly used in Europe, partly because the Water 
Framework directive requires it, but also because national regulators like Ofwat and the 
Environmental Agency in the UK (EA 2012) have made it compulsory. Many case studies have shown 
that water conservation measures and the use of non-conventional resources can be much cheaper 
than long-distance and large-scale inter-basin transfers. They might not, however, always be 
sufficient to bridge the increasing gap between demand and supply in regions confronted with rapid 
demographic and economic growth. This will be illustrated through references to several 
international situations. 
 Results of economic assessment in selected examples 
In the UK, a systematic cost-effectiveness analysis of water supply and water demand management 
options is carried out for all water resources management plans (WRMPs) prepared by water 
companies, according to guidelines developed by Ofwat and the Environmental Agency. The EA 
states that the WRMP assessments have demonstrated that large-scale transfers of water to the 
south of England from Wales or the north of England would be more expensive than other options 
available to meet current forecast demand (Environment Agency of England and Wales 2011). 
                                                          
10
 The cost-effectiveness approach consists in calculating the average annual cost of each cubic meter saved (or mobilised) with a set of 
water supply and water conservation measures. Annual costs are calculated by spreading investment costs over a duration corresponding 
to the technical lifespan of the project and adding recurring operational and maintenance costs. Diminishing effectiveness (in terms of 
volumes saved) can be accounted for in the calculation if relevant. The benefit–cost approach consists in estimating the costs and benefits 
of a set of water conservation measures that can be ranked and prioritised on the basis of a benefit–cost ratio. This approach has been 
widely used in the US, in particular because it was incorporated in software packages such as IWR-MAIN developed by the Army Corps of 
Engineers, or the Least Cost Planning Demand Management Decision Support System developed by Maddaus (Maddaus and Maddaus 
2004). 
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In the Spanish Catalonia region, Pouget et al. (2012) conducted a cost-effectiveness analysis to 
compare various adaptation strategies. Their study shows that long-distance inter-basin transfer 
(bringing water from the Rhône in France to Barcelona) would cost up to five times more (€0.5/m3) 
than water conservation in agriculture (modernisation of irrigation systems) or implementing 
seasonal tariffs (€0.1/m3). Other water supply measures were also found to be less expensive than 
large inter-basin transfer projects, e.g. managed aquifer recharge (€0.25/m3), improvements in the 
quality of currently polluted water resources (€0.25/m3), and water reuse projects (€0.3/m3). 
However, in the long term these measures would not be sufficient to bridge the gap between future 
water demand and available resources, as the latter would decline due to climate change. The 
mobilisation of new resources, through a transfer from the Rhône or desalination (the option which 
Barcelona ultimately chose), would thus be necessary. In our opinion, many studies of water 
demands are based on unquestioned optimistic demographic and economic growth forecasts, and 
this was indeed the case for the Barcelona water transfer justification. 
Examples can also be found in Australia. Table 2 below emphasises the relevance of water saving 
measures in the Australian Canberra area. 
Table 2: Levelised costs by water management options for the Canberra area (Turner and White 
2003) 
Option  Savings in 2023 
(103 m3/a) 
Present value cost 
(M$) 
Levelised cost 
($/m3) 
Water conservation  12,500 45.2 0.30 
Source substitution 6,000 308.5 4.50 
Source augmentation:  
–New cotter dam 
–Tennent 
–Tantagara 
 
3,700 
3,700 
3,700 
 
55.6 
77.4 
47 
1.45 
1.34 
1.87 
1.14 
 
3.4 IBTS VERSUS MORE GRADUALIST ADAPTABLE SOLUTIONS 
Due to the one-off nature and very long lifespan of IBT infrastructure, its design calls for a forecast of 
the long-term demand in the receiving basin and the long-term water resources availability in the 
donor basin. However, over the last decade we have seen how large are the uncertainties attached 
to demand and supply figures, and how difficult it is to forecast them accurately. Climate change in 
particular makes it difficult to predict the amount of water which will be available in both the 
receiving basin (local resources) and the basin of origin. New water infrastructure must be able to 
meet a large range of changing conditions. In that context, some authors recommend avoiding the 
use of large inflexible infrastructure which can’t adapt to changing climatic or economic conditions 
(Hallegate 2009). Instead, they recommend adopting a gradualist strategy, reducing the time horizon 
for decisions and adapting management strategies as the situation unfolds. Such flexible approaches 
necessarily involve a combination of various infrastructure solutions (storage, transfer, recycling) and 
soft adaptation strategies (demand management).  
In some countries, these recommendations have already been transferred into regulations. These 
impose an approach which combines infrastructure development with water conservation and 
recycling. This is the case for instance in California, England, and Wales. Moreover, cities which 
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depend heavily on imported water supplies tend to invest in multiple alternatives so as to reduce 
their vulnerability to interruption of their major resource. This is true for cities subject to 
earthquakes, like Marseille in France or in California. The solution consists in developing local 
resources (groundwater in Marseille, the Encina desalination plant in San Diego) and implementing 
water demand management approaches (including setting the water price at the potential marginal 
cost in case a new supply is built).  
3.5 ENERGY CONSIDERATIONS 
Since IBT projects often require moving large quantities of water over long distances and significant 
elevation differences, they are high energy-consuming water supply options. For instance, the energy 
used by the California State Water Project (SWP) to transfer water from north to south California 
represents about 2 to 3% of all electricity consumed in the state. This is equivalent to approximately 
one-third of the total average household energy use in the region (Cohen et al. 2004). With this 
perspective, non-conventional water supply options such as desalination of brackish water or reuse 
may be competitive in terms of energy requirements. For example, the water recycling system 
constructed in Orange County, southern California, uses only half the energy required to import 
water from Northern California with the SWP (Cohen et al. 2004). In a context of increasing concern 
over energy issues, the high energy requirements of IBT are likely to reduce their attractiveness 
against other technological solutions.  
 
Current water sources of supply Electricity use 
(kWh/acre foot) 
State Water Project: transferring 
water from San Francisco Bay 
Delta 
3200  
Colorado River Aqueduct  2000 
Local groundwater 570 
Ocean water desalination 
(Encina) 
4200  
Additional water supply sources  
Purchase and transfer from 
Imperial Irrigation District  
2110 
Recycling  1800 
Additional State Water Project 2240 
Adapted from Cohen et al. 2004 
 
4 IBTs in a changing socio-political context 
IBTs trigger many questions from communities affected. These questions involve a variety of issues 
including environmental impacts on donor and receiving river basins, the economic impact on donor 
regions, impact on local cultures and livelihoods, how costs and benefits are distributed (social 
justice), and issues related to public participation (Gupta and van der Zaag 2008).  
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4.1 A GROWING CONCERN FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF IBTS 
 Environmental concerns  
There is a growing awareness that IBTs can generate significant environmental impacts on donor and 
receiving basins. In the donor region, reduction of in-stream flow may endanger aquatic ecosystems 
through reduced flows, which results in increased temperature and reduced dilution of pollutant 
loads discharged to rivers. Receiving regions can also be impacted by the inflow of imported water. 
Ecosystems or species can be perturbed by changes in the hydrological regime of the receiving river, 
or by its quality. There are examples where an IBT has favored undesirable migration of species from 
one basin to another and even of invasive alien species. IBTs also modify hydrological regimes, 
reduce flow variability, and can cause a seasonal river to become a perennial river. Several examples 
in South Africa and the USA are quoted in Gupta and van der Zaag (2008). 
Fears of environmental impacts do not always rely on strong scientific evidence. For instance, the 
Aqua Domitia IBT project (southern France) is strongly opposed by citizens and environmentalists 
who fear that receiving rivers could be contaminated by PCBs and even radioactive waste leaking 
into the donor river (the Rhône). Although water quality analyses apparently show that there is no 
such risk, opponents clearly do not trust the information provided to them and instead advocate the 
precautionary principle (Commission Nationale du Débat Public 2012). 
The environmental impact of IBTs not only restricts the possibilities of constructing new 
infrastructure, it may also threaten existing ones. In California, the capacity of the Central Valley 
Project, which transfers water from the Sacramento River to the San Joachim Valley, was reduced by 
11% as a consequence of the Central Valley Improvement Act of 1992. The re-allocation of 985 
million m3 to in-stream flow was intended to regenerate salmon runs. Also in California, the Hetch 
Hetchy aqueduct to San Francisco was strongly contested at the time of its construction by John 
Muir, a prominent environmental activist. The pipeline, which captures water from the reservoir on 
the Tuolumne River in Yosemite National Park, is still a source of controversy today and 
environmentalists continue to request its removal (Ghasseni and White 2007, pp.219–220). 
The environmental constraint on IBTs has also been growing due to the recent evolution of water 
laws and regulations. In the Central Valley example, the decision to reallocate water to the aquatic 
environment was a direct consequence of the Endangered Species Act (1973). In Europe, the Water 
Framework Directive is also likely to restrict IBT possibilities, as it strengthens requirements for 
minimum in-stream flows. 
 Increased hostility from donor regions  
In the basin of origin, a loss of water can be perceived as a risk for long-term economic prosperity 
and quality of life. Communities located in donor basins feel that IBTs unfairly direct economic 
development away from them, for the benefit of predatory metropolitan areas. As a US stakeholder 
put it: “when you ship water across the state, you ship jobs as well, for economic development 
cannot occur without sufficient water supplies”.11  
                                                          
11
 Comment by Ron Cross, posted on 21 March 2010 at: 
http://onlineathens.com/stories/032110/opi_593391532.shtml 
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This potential harm has caused most inter-basin transfer proposals to be controversial, often pitting 
cities benefiting from the transfer against donor rural areas. Conflicts over IBTs are increasingly 
reported in both developed and developing countries (Cox 1999). For instance, in 1966 the city of 
Mexico started to extract and transfer groundwater from the Ixtlahuaca valley, 50 km outside the 
city. Groundwater tables rapidly declined, depriving the local population from access to a water 
resource used for drinking water and agricultural irrigation. This generated a strong conflict in the 
1970s and 80s, even threatening the physical integrity of the aqueduct (water robberies and direct 
attacks) and ultimately led to army intervention (Dyrnes and Vatn 2005).  
Conflicts over water transfers may oppose counties, regions, or states. For instance, the Atlanta 
metropolitan area (Georgia, USA) planned to purchase and transfer water from Tennessee to meet 
increasing demand. The State of Tennessee opposed the transfer by passing an Interbasin Transfer 
Act of 2000 (Carver et al. 2011). Atlanta considered other long-distance transfers from two lakes in 
northern Georgia and from southern Georgia aquifers, but these projects were abandoned as too 
politically charged. Currently, the city of Atlanta is investigating more local solutions that only involve 
transfers from one district to another. But these projects too are highly controversial.  
This led certain countries or states to tightly regulate transfers to avoid third-party effects. Indeed, in 
1996 the water code of California included five articles on ‘wheeling’, which, among others, protects 
the rights of third parties impaired by transfers. 
 The political dimension of IBTs 
Due to mounting opposition from parts of society, water transfers are increasingly debated in 
regional, state, or federal political arenas and can even influence the outcome of elections. There are 
a number of examples showing that political parties can place an IBT as a key issue on their political 
agenda prior to elections. In Western Australia for instance, the construction of the Kimberley 
scheme designed to supply the Perth metropolitan area was strongly supported by the Liberal–
National coalition during the 2005 election campaign, whereas the Labor Party favored desalination 
(Ghassemi and White 2007). In Spain, the conservative Aznar government actively supported a 
National Hydrological Plan during the 2004 elections. At the same time, the European Commission 
issued two ‘reasoned opinions’ criticising the lack of appropriate environmental impact and 
economic evaluation studies. The surprising victory of Aznar’s socialist opponent Zapatero allowed 
the new premier to shelve the huge IBT and launch a desalination plan instead. 
As a result, in many non-authoritarian countries only intra-regional transfers can still be 
implemented, using the regional solidarity argument. In France for instance, a few transfers have still 
been developed: in the Reunion Island (Indian Ocean) between west and east, in Provence Verdon-St 
Cassien (SCP); in Languedoc a regional water grid called Aqua Domitia is being considered by the 
regional bulk water supply company BRL to make up for the loss of the Rhone to Barcelona transfer, 
but it is hotly debated (see below). 
4.2 INCREASED PUBLIC PARTICIPATION FAVORS OPPOSITION TO IBTS 
Legislation in many countries now requires that consultation with people likely to be affected is 
carried out before a decision is taken on an IBT. Public consultation may lead to significant changes in 
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the design of the IBT project (its route or size) or in the amount of compensation granted to donor 
regions; it may even lead to a different option or cancellation of the project.  
In France for instance, all IBTs above 1 m3/s are subject to a public hearing process. The consultation 
is organised by an independent state agency, the Commission du Débat Public, which nominates a 
magistrate in charge of organising the public consultation. The objective of the Commission is to 
ensure a fair debate, during which the voices and arguments of proponents and opponents to the 
project can be equally heard. At the end of the consultation, the Commission does not provide 
recommendations related to the project, it only summarises in the most impartial way the views 
expressed during the consultation. The contracting authority in charge of the IBT project must then 
prepare a report explaining how it has considered the arguments raised in the debate and present 
the decision it has made. The whole process ensures maximum transparency in how the decision was 
taken. Public consultation can represent a significant financial and political cost for the promoters of 
IBTs.  
We illustrate this with the case of the proposed Aqua Domitia IBT project, in southern France. This 
project consists of extending an existing canal – the Lamour Canal – which diverts water from the 
Rhône River to supply the Languedoc coastal area. Designed and constructed in the 1960s, the 
Lamour Canal’s main function is to promote development of a diversified irrigated agriculture and 
the supply of water to coastal tourist resorts. Later on, cities such as Nimes and Montpellier hooked 
into the pipeline to substitute or complement local resources. The canal is owned by the regional 
government and operated by BRL, a large semi-public engineering company. The Aqua Domitia 
Project aims to extend the canal to the west, with the construction of a 2.5 m3/s capacity pipeline 
130 km long at a total cost of €280 million. The pipeline would interlink three main coastal basins 
(Hérault, Orb, Aude) and supply cities, tourist resorts, and about 7000 ha of irrigated agriculture. 
Although the agricultural component of the project is marginal (in terms of expected revenues from 
water sales), the promoters of the project have strongly emphasised this aspect in order to gain 
political support from rural areas and the agricultural community.  
The public consultation consisted of three main phases: the Commission first heard from 92 experts 
and stakeholders to identify the main issues to be debated; it then organised a series of 13 public 
meetings in different sub-basins impacted by the project. Five of these meetings focused on thematic 
issues12 and 6 meetings were held to allow all inhabitants to express local views of the problems and 
identify how an IBT might address these problems. All meetings were filmed and could be followed 
through the internet. A web site was established to collect comments and suggestions. Stakeholders 
were offered the option to write position papers which were disseminated by the Commission 
(Commission Nationale du Débat Public 2012). The debate mobilised experts from water 
management institutions of the territories concerned by the project and from associations 
representing environmental protection. Very few lay citizens participated to the meetings, in spite of 
an intensive communication campaign organised through various media.  
The main arguments raised by opponents were the following. The assumptions underlying future 
water demand forecasts were contested and considered to be biased in favor of the project. The IBT 
                                                          
12
 The five thematic issues were the following: 1) the IBT project and urban/economic water demand; 2) the IBT 
project and irrigated agriculture; 3) IBT and climate change; 4) IBT and alternative solutions; 5) the cost of the 
project and its impact on water pricing. 
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would encourage the development of unsustainable water demand from business activities, housing 
development, and high living standards. The quality of Rhône water was considered as a source of 
risk for receiving basins, in particular due to the presence of heavy industries (chemical, nuclear) 
upstream of the IBT intake. Alternative cheaper solutions, such as using local groundwater resources 
and implementing water conservation measures, were considered to be not sufficiently well 
investigated.  
The public consultation is complicating the decision making process for regional elected politicians 
and engineers of the water company. First, it adds a significant cost (about €1.2 million). Second, it 
offers a platform for opponent to express their views. Third, it weakens the legitimacy of the project 
if they decide to implement at the end of the consultation; project leaders had to admit that the lack 
of sufficient existing demand implied the need for public subsidies to fund what would become a 
regional water grid, which would in turn ‘reveal unspoken demands’.  
4.3 REDUCED PUBLIC FUNDING 
IBTs are very costly projects which cannot be fully financed by urban water consumers, unless the 
water price is raised above what engineers and politicians consider to be the maximum acceptable in 
social and political terms. Their construction thus relies on subsidies. A strategy to attract subsidies 
has often been to develop multipurpose IBT projects, supplying urban areas, agriculture, industries, 
and occasionally providing power generation. In Australia, water transfers supply cities and the 
mining industry. In France, many recent projects have been marketed as combined urban and 
agricultural projects – in order to obtain European subsidies from the EU agricultural policy and to 
obtain political support from the agricultural lobby (which is much more proactive than urban water 
users). In the present economic crisis, financing projects through an increase in consumer water bills 
might be considered neither socially acceptable nor politically feasible.  
4.4 WHY DO IBTS REMAIN SO ATTRACTIVE?  
In the western US, the development of new IBT projects is no longer favored because of their high 
cost compared to alternative solutions and their environmental and social impacts. Water planners 
increasingly rely on water conservation programs, water trading (purchase from irrigation districts), 
desalination, and waste water recycling. Conversely, IBTs are still considered by engineers and 
politicians in a number of European countries (e.g. France, Spain) but also in developing countries. 
What can explain the preference for multi-million euro water schemes when cheaper water demand 
management alternatives exist? Analysing the interests at stake for the different actors involved in 
such decisions can help answer this question. A preference for large scale expensive infrastructure 
projects can be said to reflect the existence of powerful coalitions between politicians, engineers, 
and financial actors who wish to protect political and economic interests.  
From a political perspective, the choice of an inter-basin transfer solution is likely to yield significant 
benefits for locally elected representatives. When supporting an IBT project, they typically appear as 
“providers of a life-giving resource that enhances health, security and prosperity” (Gumbo and van 
der Zaag 2002). Since such large projects are often subsided by government agencies or international 
donors in developed countries, they can also claim to have attracted external funds to support the 
development of the regional economy, in particular in the case of multi-purpose projects supplying 
agriculture, industry, and the population. Leaving their personal mark in local historical records can 
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be an additional motive: there are plenty of canals and pipelines around the world that bear the 
name of the local politician who initiated the project. By contrast, water demand management 
programs are perceived as constraints on the population, so there is little benefit for politicians to 
support this type of action. It is much more comfortable for a politician to be seen as finding ways to 
meet people’s water demand rather than trying to change their behavior and infringe on their 
freedom to consume what they consider a basic good. Moreover, because the money spent on water 
conservation programs does not materialise as a tangible asset, it may be perceived as a less efficient 
use of public funds than the construction of a pipeline. However, in the end, large hydraulic schemes 
bring more benefits to governments in search of legitimacy than to their countries’ economies (Allan 
2002; Molle and Berkoff 2009) 
From a technical perspective, engineers in charge of urban water schemes may prefer to build a 
water supply infrastructure than implement demand management because the infrastructure gives a 
prompt and long lasting solution to the water deficit problem. By contrast, investing in water 
conservation is considered more risky since the behavior of water users might change unexpectedly 
in the future. Technical staff are thus reluctant to engage in a strategy which does not allow them to 
certify that demand will be satisfied under all future circumstances. They may feel that accepting this 
risk undermines their professional legitimacy. Moreover, engineers tend to prefer large one-shot 
projects that they eventually can claim prowess for than immerse themselves in demand 
management projects, which may require many small and technically diverse engineering inputs, the 
involvement of non-engineering technicians such as economists (design of water conservation 
oriented rates), and communication specialists (awareness raising campaigns). The latter somehow 
implies losing control over a water system that they have been accustomed to operate by 
themselves. 
From an economic perspective, politicians and managers alike generally prefer projects entailing high 
initial investment costs; these can be subsidised, whereas operation and maintenance costs are not 
eligible for public subsidies. This is a strategy that allows water prices to be kept at a lower level, with 
obvious political benefits. Also, engineering firms have a strong interest in supply-oriented options 
such as IBTs, which generate significant work and can be added to their list of technical references. 
Large scale projects may also be favored by financial actors, such as banks and international donors, 
because it allows them to meet their lending objectives. In some nations, individuals can obtain 
personal benefits (bribes) by supporting the construction of infrastructure (Davis 2004).  
The existence of a powerful coalition supporting IBTs against a preferable alternative option is nicely 
illustrated in a case study conducted in the city of Mutare, Zimbabwe (Gumbo and van der Zaag 
2002). The study showed that the choice of the pipeline option allowed the political and economic 
interests of the three main actors to align. Similar conclusions can be reached in a case study of 
Mexico City’s water supply (Dyrnes and Vatn 20005). These authors conclude that the IBT solution 
was preferred to unpopular regulation and water conservation policies because it represented a 
relatively quick solution, popular with public opinion and Mexico City authorities.  
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5 Looking ahead: using existing IBTs for reallocating water 
For the different reasons set out in the previous section, fewer large IBT schemes are expected to be 
constructed in the 21rst century than in the previous one. Moreover, it is likely that in the future 
existing IBT schemes will be used to increase flexibility in water allocation over space and time. As 
conjunctive use management approaches gain support, IBTs will be operated in conjunction with 
aquifer storage and recovery schemes. It is also likely that IBTs will support the development of 
emerging water markets, particularly during drought years.  
5.1 IBT AND AQUIFER STORAGE AND RECOVERY (ASR) 
Because most IBTs have been sized to meet demand during drought years, their capacity is not fully 
used in normal and wet years, producing a significant cost burden. One solution to improve the 
financial sustainability of these schemes consists in using the excess capacity in normal years to store 
water in depleted aquifers. Artificial recharge can be performed during wet years, using infiltration 
ponds or deep injection wells. Stored water is then extracted in dry years when surface water is 
scarce and the full IBT capacity used. Conjunctive management improves water supply reliability. This 
strategy, referred to as conjunctive management, combines the use of a transport and a storage 
infrastructure to bridge the gap between water demands and available resources over time. Such 
conjunctive management is already implemented in Arizona, where Colorado water transferred with 
the Central Arizona Project is used for recharging groundwater in the region of Phoenix and Tucson.13 
Similarly, water from the California State Water Project is also used to recharge groundwater in the 
central valley (Kern county,14 Santa Clara valley). The combine use of IBTs and ASR however requires 
that a specific institutional framework  – water banking – be developed for tracking water rights and 
ensuring that users storing excess imported water during some years can retrieve it during drought 
years. 
5.2 FROM PIPELINE TO GRID 
While engineers and financiers will probably move away from large IBTs in the coming decades, 
existing projects are likely to continue to develop into water grids at the regional level. Here again, 
the rationale leading to the development of grids is to increase the flexibility of supply over time and 
space through physically linking production and storage infrastructures. Grids enable water to be 
moved in several directions – from where it is available to where it is required. The best historical 
case of a regional water grid is California, where water can be moved from north to south and vice 
versa through the State Water Project in the central valley, and via other IBTs from east to west, 
including the Colorado transfer. It is only after a sufficient number of links came into being that it was 
possible to imagine water trading. We have already pointed out that the potential third-party 
impacts, which add to the cost of transfers, usually limit the volumes exchanged (e.g. the IID in San 
Diego, see below).  
Australian cities responded to the 10-year long recent drought by developing such grids. The 
Queensland government is spending A$ 9 billion on a South East Queensland water grid, consisting of 
                                                          
13
 See Central Arizona Project website at: http://www.cap-az.com/index.php/departments/recharge-program. 
14
 See Water Association Kern County website at http://www.wakc.com/index.php/water-overview/sources-of-
water/87-water-banking 
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450 km of pipelines, two new dams, a desalination plant, and three advanced water treatment plants 
to deliver 350 million m3/yr additional water. It also includes greater reliance on recycled water. A 
similar project in the State of Victoria consists of creating another such grid, with six major links 
under construction. The project includes new water transfers such as the Sugarloaf Interconnector 
that would take water to Melbourne from the Goulburn River, a tributary of the water-stressed River 
Murray (Pittock et al. 2009) 
In the UK, the Environmental Agency of England and Wales recognises that there may be further 
opportunities for developing greater linkages between existing water company systems, and for 
sharing of water resources to gain some of the same benefits expected of large-scale transfers 
(Environment Agency England and Wales, 2011). However, a projected national water grid was 
shelved by the national regulator which instead pushed for conservation and leak control. And the 
idea of common carriage, i.e. separating the management of infrastructure and the production and 
sale of water, as is the case for rail and electricity, was also turned down as a public health 
precaution.  
5.3 WATER TRANSFER INFRASTRUCTURES AND TRADING IN A MATURE WATER ECONOMY  
In recent years, large-scale water transfer infrastructure has increasingly been used for reallocating 
water from some water right holders to others, based on voluntary agreements. IBTs can therefore 
support the development of water trading, which can in theory ensure improved water efficiency, 
particularly during drought conditions. Examples come mainly from the western states of the USA, 
Australia, and, more marginally, Spain. 
In Southern California, the Imperial Irrigation District (IID) is the ‘first in time’ and largest water right 
holder in the Colorado basin (3.2 billion m3 out of the 5.4 billion allocated to California). IID receives 
its water from the All American Canal (constructed in 1942) and distributes it to farmers through 
unlined distribution canals, where significant water losses occur. In the late 1980s, IID was compelled 
by the US Bureau of Reclamation to improve the technical efficiency of water use through lining 
distribution canals. Water conservation potential was estimated at about 400 million m3. IID was 
then approached by the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD) who was 
interested in providing support for the lining, and recovering and transferring part of the water 
conserved. An agreement was signed between MWD and IID in 1989 for a 35-year term. After 
implementing conservation projects, IID reduced its water abstraction from the Colorado River at 
Imperial Dam, while MWD increased its pumping from the Colorado at Parker Dam and transferred 
the water to the Los Angeles area, using the 380 km long Colorado River Aqueduct. Later on, San 
Diego came into the re-allocation game, and requested a direct transfer of IID water for its own use 
(Pincetl 2012). 
In 2003, after being accused of not using water efficiently, and under threat of the California Water 
Resources Board to get its huge share reduced, IID signed another transfer agreement with the San 
Diego County Water Authority (SDCWA), by which they agreed to transfer annually 247 million m3 of 
conserved water for a term of 75 years. IID implemented additional water conservation measures at 
the farm level, and with other projects the volume of transferred water progressively increased so as 
to reach a maximum after 10 years. However, even though the SDCWA had gone through this 
lengthy process to acquire more independence vis-à-vis MWD (whose rival Los Angeles interests 
superseded), it turned out that the best economic solution was to use existing MWD aqueducts to re-
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allocate regional water and divert it to San Diego and to another irrigation district (which held senior 
rights on the water). Moreover, the environmental movement was also able to make sure that some 
of the water would help maintain the level of the Salton Sea (a saline lake between IID and San Diego 
which is an important stop on bird migration routes) (Pincetl 2012).  
In Spain, two large IBTs, which were primarily constructed to meet growing urban and agricultural 
water demands in coastal areas, are now being used for transferring water based on voluntary 
exchanges between right holders. The first case is the Tagus–Segura IBT through which intensive fruit 
and vegetable growers in the Segura basin purchase water from more extensive farmers in the Tagus 
basin. The second is the Negratin–Almanzora connecting the upper Guadalquivir basin to the 
Andalucian coastal basins. This 120 km long pipeline was recently used to transfer water purchased 
by an Almanzora drinking water company in Andalucía to rice growers in the Guadalquivir delta 
(Garrido et al. 2013). 
IBT infrastructure can also facilitate the development of option contracts between agricultural users 
and urban areas. In a typical option contract, an urban agency pays an option premium for the right 
to purchase water at some point in the future, if climate turns out to be dry. Option contracts do not 
imply the transfer of ownership, so right-holders retain access to the water allotment when the 
option is not exercised. This type of agreement was established in California in about 1994. In 2003, 
the MWD and Paolo Verde irrigation district signed an option agreement with a 35-year term by 
which MWD can call on from 25,000 to 110,000 acre-feet (31 to 135 million m3) each year. The 
irrigation district receives a one-time fee of $3170  for each acre participating in the program and 
$600 for each acre that is fallowed during the program. There were 15 such contracts signed 
between 2003 and 2008 in California (Hansen et al. 2008; Tomkins and Weber 2010). Overall, option 
contracts represent efficient risk management instruments and they offer new perspectives for using 
existing IBT infrastructure. 
6 Conclusion 
Large hydraulic projects have underlain the success of ancient civilizations, and they are part of 
humankind’s water culture. However, most of them have been confined to a single river-basin. The 
aqueducts of the Roman Empire are a notable exception, and it remains fascinating that the Romans 
spent so much effort to build such impressive and long-lasting hydraulic architecture, but then, in the 
end, to transfer so little water. It would be interesting to link this with the economy of the time, e.g. 
looking at the slavery factor. In our capitalist economy, the value of labor and the depreciation of 
capital over time make such projects impossible to finance. And because water is heavy, hydraulic 
infrastructure usually comprises specific assets with high investment costs and slow technical 
depreciation. 
Yet in order to provide clean water to cities, the idea resurfaced of transferring water over long 
distances, an idea that returned in the classical period and rose during the 19th and 20th centuries. 
Additionally, the invention of the steam engine, of sealed pipe junctions, and also of tight-closing 
faucets, made it possible to raise water or build siphons and develop IBTs at an unprecedented scale. 
However, at the turn of the 20th century, water treatment was invented. This allowed a reduction in 
the initial investment cost by increasing operation and maintenance costs. In turn, this new 
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engineering based on water treatment and sanitation made it possible to extract water from nearby 
surface water; it made urban water much more a local affair, and shifted the burden of finance from 
the state or rich entrepreneurs to the customers. From that point on, control of water volumes 
became essential, and this did not favor large IBTs, where the bigger the flow, the smaller the 
marginal cost. 
Paradoxically, IBTs still fared very well in the colonies, and later in developing nation-states, for 
intensive agriculture: the motto after WW2 was multipurpose water projects for global economic 
development, meaning that industrial and urban water users would indirectly subsidise agriculture. 
But as soon as environmental impacts were translated into dollars, and the global economy became 
less confident in the future (thus increasing interest rates), many IBTs were weakened. Their future 
would have been better assured if they had been re-integrated into some regional water resources 
management scheme, perhaps associated with the conjunctive use of ground water and surface 
water. Large IBTs have been frequently associated with the power of upper layers of government, 
especially centralised ones. At a time when multi-level governance is on the global agenda, it 
becomes difficult to believe that transferring large quantities of water suffices to improve 
humankind’s welfare: it has to be combined with less conventional technologies and other 
institutional designs. 
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